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ABSTRACT
We study how intermediation and asset prices in over-the-counter markets are affected by illiquidity
associated with search and bargaining. We compute explicitly the prices at which investors trade
with each other as well as marketmakers' bid and ask prices in a dynamic model with strategic
agents. Bid-ask spreads are lower if investors can more easily find other investors, or have easier
access to multiple marketmakers. With a monopolistic marketmaker, bid-ask spreads are higher if
investors have easier access to the marketmaker. We characterize endogenous search and welfare,
and discuss empirical implications.
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lpederse@stern.nyu.eduIn over-the-counter (OTC) markets, an investor who wishes to sell must search
for a buyer, incurring opportunity or other costs until one is found. Some OTC
markets therefore have intermediaries. Contact with relevant intermediaries, how-
ever, is not immediate. Often, intermediaries must be approached sequentially.
Hence, when two counterparties meet, their bilateral relationship is inherently
strategic. Prices are set through a bargaining process that reects each investor's
or marketmaker's alternatives to immediate trade.
These search-and-bargaining features are empirically relevant in many mar-
kets, such as those for mortgage-backed securities, corporate bonds, emerging-
market debt, bank loans, derivatives, and certain equity markets. Also, real-estate
values are inuenced by imperfect search, the relative impatience of investors for
liquidity, outside options for trade, and the role and protability of brokers.
We build a dynamic asset-pricing model capturing these features, and analyt-
ically derive the equilibrium allocations, prices negotiated between investors, as
well as marketmakers' bid and ask prices. We show how these equilibrium prop-
erties depend on investors' search abilities, marketmaker accessibility, and bar-
gaining powers. We determine the search intensities that marketmakers choose,
and derive the associated welfare implications of investment in marketmaking.
Our model of search is a variant of the coconuts model of Diamond (1982).1
A continuum of investors contact each other, independently, at some mean rate
, a parameter reecting search ability. Similarly, marketmakers contact agents
at some intensity  that reects dealer availability. When agents meet, they bar-
1Our model differs from Diamond (1982), and the labor literature more generally, by consid-
ering repeated trade of long-lived assets. The monetary search literature (for example, Kiyotaki
and Wright (1993)) also considers long-lived assets, but, with the exception of Trejos and Wright
(1995), it considers exogenous prices. Our model has similarities with that of Trejos and Wright
(1995), but their objectives are different and they do not study marketmaking. See also Harris
(1979).
1gain over the terms of trade. Gains from trade arise from heterogeneous costs or
benets of holding assets. For example, an asset owner can be anxious to sell
because of a liquidity need or because of hedging motives. Marketmakers can off-
load their inventories in a frictionless inter-dealer market and trade with investors,
capturing part of the difference between the inter-dealer price and investors' reser-
vation values.
Asset pricing with exogenous trading frictions has been studied by Amihud
and Mendelson (1986), Constantinides (1986), and Vayanos (1998). We endog-
enize the trading frictions arising through search and bargaining, and show their
effects on asset prices. In follow-up work, Dufe, G arleanu, and Pedersen (2003)
extend the model developed here in order to characterize the impact on asset pric-
ing of search in settings with risk aversion and risk limits, while Weill (2002)
and Vayanos and Wang (2002) consider cross-sectional asset pricing in extensions
with multiple assets.
Market frictions have been used to explain the existence and behavior of mar-
ketmakers. Notably, marketmakers' bid and ask prices have been explained by
inventory considerations (Garman (1976), Amihud and Mendelson (1980), and
Ho and Stoll (1981)), and by adverse selection arising from asymmetric informa-
tion (Bagehot (1971), Glosten and Milgrom (1985), and Kyle (1985)). In contrast,
we model marketmakers who have no inventory risk because of the existence of
inter-dealer markets, and our agents are symmetrically informed. In our model,
bid and ask prices are set in light of investors' outside options, which reect both
the accessibility of other marketmakers and investors' own abilities to nd coun-
terparties.
We show that bid-ask spreads are lower if investors can nd each other more
2easily.2 The intuition is that improving an investor's search alternatives forces
marketmakers to give better prices. This result is supported by the experimental
evidence of Lamoureux and Schnitzlein (1997).
An investor also improves his bargaining position relative to a marketmaker if
he can more easily nd other marketmakers. Hence, despite the bilateral nature of
bargaining between a marketmaker and an investor, marketmakers are effectively
in competition with each other over order ow, given the option of investors to
search for better terms. Consistent with this intuition, we prove that competitive
prices and vanishing spreads obtain as marketmakers' contact intensities become
large, provided that marketmakers do not have all of the bargaining power.
In summary, if investors are more sophisticated (that is, have better access to
other investors or to marketmakers who do not have total bargaining power), they
receive a tighter bid-ask spread. This implication sets our theory of intermediation
apart from information-based models, in which more sophisticated (that is, better
informed) investors receive a wider bid-ask spread.
In an extension with heterogeneous investors in the same OTC market, we
show that more sophisticated investors (those with better access to marketmakers)
receive tighter bid-ask spreads because of their improved outside options. Hence,
this result holds both when comparing across markets and when comparing across
investors in the same market. This sets our theory apart from inventory-based
models, since these would not imply differential treatment across investors.3 Fur-
2We show that our model specializes in a specic way to the standard general-equilibrium
paradigm as bilateral trade becomes increasingly active, under conditions to be described, ex-
tending a chain of results by Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985), Gale (1987), Gale (1986a), Gale
(1986b), and McLennan and Sonnenschein (1991), in a manner explained later in our paper. Thus,
standard asset-pricing theory is not excluded, but rather is found at the end of the spectrum of
increasingly active markets.
3We note that, when comparing across markets, inventory considerations may have the same
bid-ask implication as our search model, because more frequent meetings between investors and
3ther, in the heterogeneous-agents extension, investors with lower search ability
may refrain entirely from trade.
Our result seems consistent with behavior in certain OTC markets, such as
those for interest-rate swaps and foreign exchange, in which asymmetric infor-
mation is limited. Anecdotal evidence suggests that sales traders give more
competitive prices to sophisticated investors, perceived to have better outside op-
tions.
We also consider the case in which the marketmaker has total bargaining
power. The bid-ask spread of such a monopolistic marketmaker vanishes as in-
vestors are increasingly able to meet each other quickly, as with the case of com-
peting marketmakers. In contrast, however, more frequent contact between in-
vestors and a monopolistic marketmaker actually widens spreads, because of the
investors' poorer outside options. Specically, an investor's threat to nd a coun-
terparty himself is less credible if the marketmaker has already executed most of
the efcient trades, making it harder to nd potential counterparties.
Our results regarding the role of investors' searches for each other on dealer
spreads are similar in spirit to those of Gehrig (1993) and Yavas ¸ (1996), who
consider monopolistic marketmaking in one-period models.4 We show that dy-
namics have an important effect on agents' bargaining positions, and thus asset
prices, bid-ask spreads, and investments in marketmaking capacity. Rubinstein
and Wolinsky (1987) study the complementary effects of marketmaker inventory
and consignment agreements in a dynamic search model.
We consider marketmakers' choices of search intensity, and the social ef-
marketmakers may result in lower inventory costs.
4See also Bhattacharya and Hagerty (1987) who introduce dealers into the Diamond (1982)
model, and Moresi (1991) who considers intermediation in a search model in which buyers and
sellers exit the market after they trade.
4ciency of these choices. A monopolistic marketmaker imposes additional net-
working losses on investors because his intermediation renders less valuable the
opportunity of investors to trade directly with each other. A monopolistic market-
maker thus provides more intermediation than is socially efcient. Competitive
marketmakers may provide even more intermediation, as they do not consider, in
their allocation of resources to search, the effect that their intermediation has on
the equilibrium allocation of assets among investors.5
1 Model
We x a probability space (
;F;Pr) and a ltration fFt : t  0g of sub--
algebras satisfying the usual conditions, as dened by Protter (1990). The l-
tration represents the resolution over time of information commonly available to
agents.
Two kinds of agents, investors and marketmakers, consume a single non-
storable consumption good that is used as a numeraire. All agents are risk-neutral
and innitely lived, with time preferences determined by a constant discount rate
r > 0. Marketmakers hold no inventory and maximize prots.
Investors have access to a risk-free bank account with interest rate r and to
an OTC market for a consol, meaning an asset paying dividends at the constant
rate of 1 unit of consumption per year.6 The consol can be traded only when an
investor nds another investor or a marketmaker. The associated search processes
5Studying endogenous search in labor markets, Mortensen (1982) and Hosios (1990) nd that
agents may choose inefcient search levels because they do not internalize the gains from trade
realized by future trading partners. Moen (1997) shows that search markets can be efcient under
certain conditions.
6Dufe, G arleanu, and Pedersen (2003) consider extensions with risky securities and risk-
averse investors.
5are described below. The bank account can also be viewed as a liquid security
that can be traded instantly. We require that the value Wt of the bank account be
bounded below, ruling out Ponzi schemes.
A fraction s of investors are initially endowed with one unit of the asset. In-
vestors can hold at most one unit of the asset and cannot shortsell. Because agents
have linear utility, we can restrict attention to equilibria in which, at any given
time and state of the world, an investor holds either 0 or 1 unit of the asset.
An investor is characterized by whether he owns the asset or not, and by an
intrinsic type that is high or low. A low-type investor, when owning the asset
has a holding cost of  per time unit. A high-type investor has no such holding
cost. There are multiple interpretations of the investor types. For instance, a
low-type investor may have (i) low liquidity (that is, a need for cash), (ii) high
nancing costs, (iii) hedging reasons to sell,7 (iv) a relative tax disadvantage,8 or
(v) a lower personal use of the asset. Any investor's intrinsic type switches from
low to high with intensity u, and switches back with intensity d. For any pair of
investors, their intrinsic-type processes are assumed to be independent.
The full set of investor types is T = fho;hn;lo;lng, with the letters h and
l designating the investor's intrinsic liquidity state, as above, and with o or
n indicating whether the investor owns the asset or not, respectively.
We suppose that there is a continuum (a non-atomic nite-measure space)
of investors, and let (t) denote the fraction at time t of investors of type  2 T .
Because the fractions of each type of investor add to 1 at any time t,
ho(t) + hn(t) + lo(t) + ln(t) = 1: (1)
7Dufe, G arleanu, and Pedersen (2003) explore this interpretation in an extension with risk
aversion.
8Dai and Rydqvist (2003) provide a tax example with potential search effects.
6Because the total fraction of investors owning an asset is s,
ho(t) + lo(t) = s: (2)
A pair of investors can negotiate a trade of the consol whenever they meet, for
a mutually agreeable number of units of current consumption. (The determination
of the terms of trade is to be addressed later.) Investors meet, however, only at
random times, in a manner idealized as follows. At the successive event times of
a Poisson process with some intensity parameter , an investor contacts another
agent, chosen from the entire population at random, meaning with a uniform
distribution across the investor population.9 Random switches in intrinsic types
types are independent of the matching processes. Hence, an investor contacts
an investor from a group D with intensity D, where D is the fraction of D
investors in the population. Thus, another group C of investors contact group D
investors at a total rate of CD. Since group D investors contact C investors at
the same total rate, the total meeting intensity between the two groups is 2CD.
Marketmakers are also found through search, implying that an investor must
bargain with marketmakers sequentially, as they are found. There is a unit mass
of independent non-atomic marketmakers with a xed intensity, , of meeting an
investor.10 When an investor meets a marketmaker, they bargain over the terms of
trade as described in the next section. Marketmakers have access to an immedi-
ately accessible inter-dealer market, on which the unload their positions, so that
they have no inventory at any time.
9The exponential inter-contact-time distribution is natural, as it would arise from Bernoulli
(independent success-failure) contact trials, with a success probability of  during a contact-time
interval of length , in the limit as  goes to zero. The analysis further relies on independence
assumptions and an application of the law of large numbers, formalized in Dufe and Sun (2004).
(See, also, Footnote 13).
10It would be equivalent to have a mass k of dealers with contact intensity =k, for any k > 0.
7Certain over-the-counter markets do not have marketmakers. Such markets
are, of course, described by the special case of our model with  = 0. Hence, our




In this section, we explicitly compute the allocations and prices forming a dy-
namic search-and-bargaining equilibrium. In particular, we compute the price
negotiated directly between investors, marketmaker's bid and ask prices, and the
inter-dealer price.
In equilibrium, low-type asset owners want to sell and high-type non-owners
want to buy. When two such agents meet, they bargain over the price. Similarly,
when investors meet a marketmaker, they bargain over the price. An investor's
bargaining position depends on his outside option, which in turn depends on the
availability of other counterparties, both now and in the future, and a market-
maker's bargaining position depends on the inter-dealer price. In deriving the
equilibrium, we rely on the insight from bargaining theory that trade happens in-
stantly.11 This allows us to derive a dynamic equilibrium in two steps. First, we
derive the equilibrium masses of the different investor types. Second, we compute
agents' value functions and transaction prices (taking as given the masses).
Assuming that the law of law of large numbers applies (see Dufe and Sun
11In general, bargaining leads to instant trade when agents do not have asymmetric information.
Otherwise there can be strategic delay. In our model, it does not matter whether agents have private
information about their own type for it is common knowledge that a gain from trade arises only
between between agents of types lo and hn.
8(2004)), the rate of change of the mass lo(t) of low-type owners is almost surely
_ lo(t) =  (2hn(t)lo(t) + m(t))   ulo(t) + dho(t); (3)
where m(t) = minflo(t);hn(t)g. The rst term in (3) reects the fact that
agents of type hn contact those of type lo at a total rate of hn(t)lo(t), while
agents of type lo contact those of type hn at the same total rate hn(t)lo(t). At
bothofthesetypesofencounters, theagentoftypelobecomesoneoftypeln. This
implies a total rate of reduction of mass due to these encounters of 2hn(t)lo(t).
Similarly, investors of type lo meet marketmakers with a total contact intensity of
lo(t). If lo(t)  hn(t) then all these meetings lead to trade, and the lo agent
becomes a ln agent, resulting in a reduction of lo of lo(t). If lo(t) > hn(t),
then not all these meetings result in trade. This is because marketmakers buy from
lo investors and sell to hn investors, and, in equilibrium, the total intensity of sell-
ing must equal the intensity of buying. Marketmakers meet lo-investors with total
intensity lo and hn-investors with total intensity hn, and, therefore, investors
on the long side of the market are rationed. In particular, if lo(t) > hn(t) then
lo agents trade with marketmakers only at the intensity hn. In equilibrium this
rationing can be the outcome of bargaining because the marketmaker's reserva-
tion value (that is, the inter-dealer price) is equal to the reservation value of the
lo-investor.
Finally, the term ulo(t) reects the migration of owners from low to high
intrinsic types, and the last term dho(t) reects owners' change from high to
low intrinsic types.
9The rate of change of the other investor-type masses are,
_ hn(t) =  (2hn(t)lo(t) + m(t)) + uln(t)   dhn(t) (4)
_ ho(t) = (2hn(t)lo(t) + m(t)) + ulo(t)   dho(t) (5)
_ ln(t) = (2hn(t)lo(t) + m(t))   uln(t) + dhn(t): (6)
As in (3), the rst terms reect the result of trade, and the last two terms are the
result of intrinsic-type changes.
In most of the paper we focus on stationary equilibria, that is, equilibria in
which the masses are constant. In our welfare analysis, however, it is more nat-
ural to take the initial masses as given, and, therefore, we develop some results
with any initial mass distribution. The following proposition asserts the existence,
uniqueness, and stability of the steady state.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique constant steady-state solution to (1)(6).
From any initial condition (0) 2 [0;1]4 satisfying (1) and (2), the unique so-
lution (t) to (3)(6) converges to the steady state as t ! 1.
A particular agent's type process f(t) :  1 < t < +1g is, in steady-state, a
4-state Markov chain with state space T , and with constant switching intensities
determined in the obvious way12 by the steady-state population masses  and the
intensities , u, and d. The unique stationary distribution of any agent's type
process coincides with the cross-sectional distribution  of types characterized13
in Proposition 1.
12For example, the transition intensity from state lo to state ho is u, the transition intensity
from state lo to state ln is 2hn, and so on, for the 4  3 switching intensities.
13This is a result of the law of large numbers, in the form of Theorem C of Sun (2000), which
provides the construction of our probability space (
;F;Pr) and agent space [0;1], with an ap-
propriate -algebra making 
  [0;1] into what Sun calls a rich space, with the properties that:
(i) for each individual agent in [0;1], the agent's type process is indeed a Markov chain in T with
the specied generator, (ii) the unconditional probability distribution of the agents' type is always
10Turning to the determination of an equilibrium transaction prices, we rst con-
jecture, and verify shortly, a natural steady-state equilibrium utility for remaining
lifetime consumption.
With these equilibrium masses, we will determine the price P negotiated di-
rectly between lo and hn investors, the bid price B at which investors sell to
marketmakers, the ask price A at which investors buy from marketmakers, and
the inter-dealer price. For this, we use dynamic programming, by rst computing
an investor's utility at time t for remaining lifetime consumption. For a partic-
ular agent this value function depends, naturally, only on the agent's current
type (t) 2 T , the current wealth Wt in his bank account, and time. Because
of risk neutrality, the value function has the form Wt + V(t)(t). Because any
budget-feasible consumption withdrawals from liquid wealth is optimal, we sim-
ply assume that agents adjust their consumption so that Wt = 0 for all t. As shown
in the appendix, the value functions satisfy:
_ Vlo = rVlo   u(Vho   Vlo)   2hn(P + Vln   Vlo)   (B + Vln   Vlo)   (1   )
_ Vln = rVln   u(Vhn   Vln)
_ Vho = rVho   d(Vlo   Vho)   1 (7)
_ Vhn = rVhn   d(Vln   Vhn)   2ho(Vho   Vhn   P)   (Vho   Vhn   A);
where the value functions (V), prices (P;A;B), and masses (), depend on time
unless the initial masses are the steady-state ones.
These value functions imply that an lo-investor benets from a sale at any
price greater than Vlo   Vln, and an hn-investor will benet from a purchase at
the steady-state distribution  on T given by Proposition 1, (iii) agents' type transitions are almost
everywhere pair-wise independent, and (iv) the cross-sectional distribution of types is also given
by , almost surely, at each time t.
11any price smaller than Vho   Vhn. Bargaining between the investors leads to a
price between these two values. Specically, Nash (1950) bargaining with seller
bargaining power of q 2 [0;1] yields
P = (Vlo   Vln)(1   q) + (Vho   Vhn)q: (8)
This is also the outcome of the simultaneous-offer bargaining game described in
Kreps (1990), and of the alternating-offers bargaining game in Dufe, G arleanu,
and Pedersen (2003).
Similarly, the bid and ask prices are determined through a bargaining en-
counter between investors and marketmakers in which a marketmaker's outside
option is to trade in the interdealer market at a price of M. Marketmakers have
a fraction, z 2 [0;1], of the bargaining power when facing an investor. Hence, a
marketmaker buys from an investor at the bid price B, and sells at the ask price
A, determined by
A = (Vho   Vhn)z + M (1   z) (9)
B = (Vlo   Vln)z + M (1   z): (10)
As discussed above, in equilibrium, the marketmakers and the investors on
the long side of the market must be indifferent to trading. Hence, if lo  hn,
marketmakers meet more potential buyers than sellers. The inter-dealer price,
M, is therefore equal to the ask price, A, and to any buyer's reservation value,
Vho   Vhn. Similarly, if lo > hn, then M = B = Vlo   Vln.
In steady state, it is easy to see which side of the market is rationed because
12the steady-state fraction of high-type agents is u(d + u) 1, so we have




Hence, lo < hn in steady state if and only if the following condition is satised.
Condition 1 s < u=(u + d):
The equations for prices and value functions can be solved explicitly. Condi-
tion 1 seemsthe natural case, andthe solution in that caseis givenby the following
theorem; the complementary case is treated in the appendix.
Theorem 2 For any given initial mass distribution (0), there exists a subgame-
perfect Nash equilibrium. There is a unique steady-state equilibrium. Under
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(1   q)r + d + 2lo(1   q)
r + d + 2lo(1   q) + u + 2hnq + (1   z)
: (13)
These explicit prices are intuitive. Each price is the present value, 1=r, of div-
idends, reduced by an illiquidity discount. All of these prices decrease in the
bargaining power, z, of the marketmaker, because a higher z makes trading more
costly for investors. The prices increase, however, in the ease of meeting a mar-
ketmaker () and in the ease of nding another investor (), provided  and  are
large enough. The interesting effects of high search intensities are discussed in
detail in Section 4.
13From Theorem 2, the bid-ask spread (A   B) is increasing in the market-
maker's bargaining power z. The bid-ask spread is decreasing in , since a high 
means that an investor can easily nd a counterparty himself, which improves his
bargaining position. The bid-ask spread is also decreasing in , provided z < 1
and  is sufciently large. A higher  implies that an investor can quickly nd
another marketmaker, and this sequential competition improves his bargaining
position. If z = 1, however, then the bid-ask spread is increasing in . The
case of z = 1 is best interpreted as a monopolistic marketmaker as we show in
the next section. These comparative-statics results can be derived from the price
equations (11)(13) and from Equation (A.2), which characterizes the steady-state
investor masses.
3 Monopolistic Marketmaking
We assume here that investors can trade with the monopolistic marketmaker only
when they meet one of the marketmaker's non-atomic dealers. There is a unit
mass of such dealers who contact potential investors randomly and pair-wise in-
dependently, letting  be the intensity with which a dealer contacts a given agent.
Dealers instantly balance their positions with their marketmaking rm, which,
on the whole, holds no inventory. When an investor meets a dealer, the dealer is
assumed to have all of the bargaining power since the marketmaker's prot is not
affected by any one innitesimal trade. Hence, the dealer quotes an ask price, A,
and a bid price, B, that are, respectively, a buyer's and a seller's reservation value.
With these assumptions, the equilibrium is computed as in Section 2. The
masses are determined by (3)(6) and the prices are given by Theorem 2 with
z = 1. In equilibrium, B  P  A:
14It might seem surprising that a single monopolistic marketmaker is equivalent
for pricing purposes to many competing non-atomic marketmakers with full
bargaining power (z = 1). The result follows from the fact that a search economy
is inherently un-competitive, in that each time agents meet, a bilateral bargaining
relationship obtains. With many non-atomic marketmakers it is, however, more
natural to assume that z < 1, and, hence, this difference in marketmaker bargain-
ing power distinguishes the two kinds of intermediation. The distinction between
monopolistic and competitive marketmakers is clearer when search intensities are
endogenized in Section 7.
4 Fast Search Leads to Competitive Prices?
A competitive Walrasian equilibrium is characterized by a single price process at
which agents may buy and sell instantly, such that supply equals demand in each
state and at every point in time. A Walrasian allocation is efcient and all assets
are held by agents of high type, if there are enough such agents,14 which is the
case in steady state if s < u=(u+d): If s > u=(u+d), all high-type agents
own assets, and the rest of the assets are held by low-type investors. Finally, if
s = u=(u + d), the number of sellers is equal to the number of buyers.
14The quantity of such agents can be thought, for instance, as the capacity for taking a certain
kind of risk.































The Walras equilibrium price, a version of what is sometimes called the Gordon
dividend growth model of valuation, is the reservation value of holding the asset
forever for a hypothetical investor who is always of high type.
In case of s > u=(u+d), the masses are determined similarly and since the
marginal investor has low liquidity, the Walrasian price is the reservation value of
holding the asset indenitely for a hypothetical agent who is permamently of low
type (that is, P  = (1   )=r). If s = u=(u + d), then any price P  between
1=r and (1   )=r is a Walrasian equilibrium.
Clearly, fast search by either investors or marketmakers implies that alloca-
tions approach the efcient allocations, , prevailing in a Walrasian market. The
following theorem further determines the circumstances under which prices ap-
proach the competitive Walrasian prices, P .
Theorem 3 Let (k;k;k;Bk;Ak;P k) be a sequence of stationary search equi-
libria.
1. [Fast investors.] If k ! 1, (k) is any sequence, and 0 < q < 1 then
16k ! , and Bk, Ak, and P k converge to the same price, which is Wal-
rasian.
2. [Fast competing marketmakers.] If k ! 1, (k) is any sequence, and
z < 1 then k ! , and Bk, Ak, and P k converge to the same price,
which is Walrasian.
3. [Fast monopolistic marketmaker.] If k =  is constant, k ! 1 is an
increasing sequence, and z = 1, then k !  and the bid-ask spread,
Ak   Bk, is increasing.
Part one shows that prices become competitive and that the bid-ask spread ap-
proaches zero as investors nd each other more quickly, regardless of the nature
of intermediation. In other words, the investors' search alternative forces the mar-
ketmakers to offer relatively competitive prices, consistent with the evidence of
Lamoureux and Schnitzlein (1997).15
Part two shows that fast intermediation by competing marketmakers also leads
to competitive prices and vanishing bid-ask spreads. This may seem surprising,
given that an investor trades with the rst encountered marketmaker, and this mar-
ketmaker could have almost all bargaining power (z close to 1). As  increases,
however, the investor's outside option when bargaining with a marketmaker im-
proves, because he can more easily meet another marketmaker, and this sequential
competition ultimately results in competitive prices.
Part three shows that fast intermediation by a monopolistic marketmaker does
not lead to competitive prices. In fact, the bid-ask spread widens as intermedia-
15This result holds, under certain conditions, even if the monopolistic marketmaker can be
approached instantly ( = +1). In this case, for any nite , all trades are done using the
marketmaker, but as the investors' outside options improve, even a monopolistic marketmaker
needs to quote competitive prices.
17tion by marketmakers increases. This is because an investor's potential threat to
search for a direct trade with another investor becomes increasingly less persua-
sive, since the mass of investors with whom there are gains from trade shrinks.
Contrary to our result, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) nd that their bar-
gaining equilibrium (without intermediaries) does not converge to the competitive
equilibrium as trading frictions approach zero. Gale (1987) argues that this failure
is due to the fact that the total mass of agents entering their economy is innite,
which makes the competitive equilibrium of the total economy undened. Gale
(1987) shows that if the total mass of agents is nite, then the economy (which is
not stationary) is Walrasian in the limit. He suggests that, when considering sta-
tionary economies, one should compare the bargaining prices to those of a ow
equilibrium rather than a stock equilibrium. Our model has a natural determi-
nation of steady-state masses, even though no agent enters the economy. This is
accomplished by considering agents whose types change over time.16 We are able
to reconcile a steady-state economy with convergence to Walrasian outcomes in
both a ow and stock sense, both for allocations and for prices, and by increasing
both investor search and marketmaker search.17
5 Numerical Example
We illustrate some of the search effects on asset pricing and marketmaking with
a numerical example. Figure 1 shows the marketmakers' bid (B), and ask (A)
16Gale (1986a), Gale (1986b), and McLennan and Sonnenschein (1991) show that a bargaining
game implements Walrasian outcomes in the limiting case with no frictions (that is, no discount-
ing) in much richer settings for preferences and goods. See also Binmore and Herrero (1988).
17Other important differences between our framework and that of Rubinstein and Wolinsky
(1985) are that we accommodate repeated trade, and that we diminish search frictions explicitly
through  rather than implicitly through the discount rate. See Bester (1988, 1989) for the impor-
tance of diminishing search frictions directly.
18prices, as well as the inter-investor price (P). These prices are plotted as func-
tions of the intensity, , of meeting dealers. The top panel deals with the case
of competing marketmakers with bargaining power z = 0:8, whereas the bottom
panel treats a monopolistic marketmaker (z = 1). The parameters underlying
these graphs are as follows. First, d = 0:1 and u = 1, which implies that an
agent is of high liquidity type 91% of the time. An investor nds other investors
on average every two weeks, that is,  = 26, and selling investors have bargaining
power q = 0:5. The supply is s = 0:8, and the interest rate is r = 0:05
Since allocations become more efcient as  increases, in both cases, all prices
increase with . Interestingly, in the case of competing marketmakers (z = 0:8),
the price increases to the Walrasian price 1=r = 20 and the bid-ask spread de-
creases to zero. In the case of a monopolist marketmaker (z = 1), on the other
hand, the prices are bounded away from 1=r = 20, and the bid-ask spread is
increasing in .
The intuition for this difference is as follows. When the dealers' contact in-
tensities increase, they execute more trades. Investors then nd it more difcult
to contact other investors with whom to trade. If dealers have all of the bargain-
ing power, this leads to wider spreads. If dealers don't have all of the bargaining
power, however, then higher marketmaker intensity leads to a narrowing of the
spread, because an investor has an improved threat of waiting to trade with the
next encountered marketmaker.
6 Heterogeneous Investors
So far, we have assumed that investors are homogeneous with respect to the speed
















































Competitive Dealers, z = 0:8

















































Competitive Dealers, z = 0:8
Monopolistic Dealer, z = 1
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
Figure 1: The solid line shows the price P used when investors trade with each other; the dashed
lines show the bid (B) and ask (A) prices used when investors trade with a marketmaker. The
prices are functions of the intensity () with which an investor meets a dealer, which is plotted on
a logarithmic scale. The bargaining power of the marketmaker is z = 0:8 in the left panel, and
z = 1 in the right panel.
20vestors are more sophisticated than others, in the sense that they have faster and
easier access to counterparties. To capture this effect, we assume that there are
two different investor classes, sophisticated, of total mass s, and unsophisti-
cated, of mass 1 s. We assume that sophisticated investors meet marketmakers
with an intensity s, while unsophisticated investors meet marketmakers at inten-
sity u, where u < s. We assume here that investors cannot trade directly with
each other, that is,  = 0. If this assumption is relaxed, and investors are able to
nd each other (possibly with type-dependent speeds), then the nature of the equi-
librium that we will describe would change for certain parameters. In particular,
sophisticated investors would, under certain conditions, prot from executing as
many trades as possible, and would start acting like marketmakers. This interest-
ing effect is beyond the scope if this paper; we focus on how marketmakers react
to differences in investor sophistication.
An investor's type is observable to the marketmakers, who have bargaining
power z < 1. When a sophisticated investor meets a marketmaker, the outcome
of their bargaining is a bid price of Bs or an ask price of As.
When an unsophisticated investor needs to buy or sell, locating a marketmaker
takes more time. This results in higher expected holding costs associated with
illiquidity and, importantly, implies a poor bargaining position. Hence, unsophis-
ticated investors receive different bid and ask prices, which we denote by Bu and
Au, respectively.
Whenthesupplyofsharesissolowthatthesophisticatedinvestorsaremarginal
buyers, then all unsophisticated investors optimally stay out of the market, that is,
they never buy any shares. Similarly, when the supply of shares is large, sophisti-
cated investors are marginal sellers, and all unsophisticated investors hold a share
each, never selling. With an intermediate supply, all investors trade, but the unso-
21phisticated investors trade at a larger spread.
Thefollowingtheoremcharacterizesthemostimportantpropertiesoftheequi-
librium with heterogeneous investors; a full characterization is in the appendix.
Theorem 4 If s < s u
u+d or s > 1   s d
u+d then unsophisticated investors
do not trade. Otherwise, all investors trade, and marketmakers quote a larger
bid-ask spread to unsophisticated investors than to sophisticated investors. That
is, Au   Bu > As   Bs. In particular, an agent who meets a marketmaker with
intensity  faces a bid-ask of
A   B =
z
r + u + d + (1   z)
: (15)
7 Endogenous Search and Welfare
Here, we investigate the search intensities that marketmakers would optimally
choose in the two cases considered above: a single monopolistic marketmaker and
non-atomic competing marketmakers. We illustrate how marketmakers' choices
of search intensities depend on: (i) a marketmaker's personal inuence on the
equilibrium allocations of assets, and (ii) a marketmaker's bargaining power. We
take investors' search intensities as given. Considering the interactions arising if
both investors and intermediaries choose search intensities would be an interesting
issue for future research.18
Because the marketmakers' search intensities, collectively, affect the masses 
of investor types, it is natural to take as given the initial masses, (0), of investors,
rather than to compare based on the different steady-state masses corresponding
18Related to this, Pagano (1989) considers a one-period model in which investors choose be-
tween searching for a counterparty and trading on a centralized market.
22to different choices of search intensities. Hence, in this section, we are not relying
on a steady-state analysis.
We assume that a marketmaker chooses one search intensity and abides by it.
This assumption is convenient, and can be motivated by interpreting the search
intensity as based on a technology that is difcult to change. A full dynamic
analysis of the optimal control of marketmaking intensities with small switching
costs would be interesting, but seems difcult. We merely assume that market-
makers choose  so as to maximize the present value, using their discount rate r,
of future marketmaking spreads, net of the rate  () of technology costs, where
  : [0;1) ! [0;1) is assumed for technical convenience to be continuously
differentiable, strictly convex, with  (0) = 0,  0(0) = 0, and lim!1  0() = 1.
The marketmaker's trading prot, per unit of time, is the product of the volume
of trade, m, and the bid-ask spread, A B. Hence, a monopolistic marketmaker












where m = minflo;hng, and where we are using the obvious notation to indi-
cate dependence of the solution on  and t.
Any one non-atomic marketmaker does not inuence the equilibrium masses






























The following theorem characterizes equilibrium search intensities in the case of
patient marketmakers.
Theorem 5 There exists a marketmaking intensity M that maximizes M().
There exists  r > 0 such that, for all r <  r and for each z 2 [0;1], unique number
C(z) solves (17). Moreover, C(0) = 0, C(z) is increasing in z, and C(1) is
larger than any solution, M, to the monopolist's problem.
In addition to providing the existence of equilibrium search intensities, this re-
sult establishes that: (i) competing marketmakers provide more marketmaking
services if they can capture a higher proportion of the gains from trade, and (ii)
competing marketmakers with full bargaining power provide more marketmak-
ing services than a monopolistic marketmaker, since they do not internalize the
consequences of their search on the masses of investor types.
To consider the welfare implications of marketmaking in our search economy,
we adopt a notion of social welfare, the sum of the utilities of investors and
marketmakers. This can be interpreted as the total investor utility in the case in
which the marketmaker prots are redistributed to investors, for instance through
share holdings. With our form of linear preferences, maximizing social welfare
is a meaningful concept in that it is equivalent to requiring that utilities cannot
be Pareto improved by changing allocations and by making initial consumption
transfers.19 By investor welfare, we mean the total of investors' utilities, as-
19Also, this utilitarian social welfare function can be justied by considering the utility of an
agent behind the veil of ignorance, not knowing what type of agent he will become.
24suming that the marketmaker prots are not redistributed to investors. We take
marketmaker welfare to be the total valuation of marketmaking prots, net of
the cost of intermediation.
In our risk-neutral framework, welfare losses are easily quantied. The to-
tal social loss is the cost  () of intermediation plus the present value of the
stream lo(t);t  0; of dividends wasted through mis-allocation. At a given

































We consider rst the case of monopolistic marketmaking. We let M be the
level of intermediation optimally chosen by the marketmaker, and S be the so-
cially optimal level of intermediation. The relation between the monopolistic mar-
ketmaker's chosen level M of intensity and the socially optimal intensity S is
characterized in the following theorem.
Theorem 6 Let z = 1. (i) If investors cannot meet directly, that is,  = 0, then
the investor welfare wI() is independent of , and a monopolistic marketmaker
provides the socially optimal level S of intermediation, that is, M = S.
(ii) If  > 0, then wI() decreases in , and the monopolistic marketmaker over-
25invests in intermediation, that is, M > S, provided q is 0 or 1.
The point of this result is that if investors cannot search, then their utilities
do not depend on the level of intermediation because the monopolist extracts all
gains from trade. In this case, because the monopolist gets all social benets from
providing intermediation and bears all the costs, he chooses the socially optimal
level.
If, on the other hand, investors can trade directly with each other, then the
marketmaker may exploit the opportunity to invest in additional search for trades
in order to reduce the opportunities of investors to trade directly with each other.
Therefore, investor welfare decreases with . Consequently, the marketmaker's
marginal benet from intermediation is larger than the social benet, so there is
too much intermediation.20
We now turn to the case of non-atomic (competing) marketmakers. We saw
above that the equilibrium level of intermediation of a non-atomic marketmaker
depends critically on its bargaining power. With no bargaining power, such a
marketmaker provides no intermediation. With complete bargaining power, they
search more than a monopolistic marketmaker would.
A government may sometimes be able to affect intermediaries' market power,
forinstancethroughtheenforcementofregulation(DeMarzo, Fishman, andHagerty
(2000)). Hence, we consider the following questions: How much marketmaker
market power is socially optimal? How much market power would the intermedi-
aries like to have? Would investors want that marketmakers to have some market
power? These questions are answered in the following theorem, in which we let
zI, zS, and zM denote the marketmaker bargaining power that would be chosen
20If 0 < q < 1, then increasing  has the additional effect of changing the relative strength
of investors' bargaining positions with the marketmaker, because it changes their outside options,
which complicates the calculations.
26by, respectively, the investors, a social-welfare maximizing planner, and market-
makers.
Theorem 7 It holds that zI > 0. There is some  r > 0 such that, provided r <  r,
we have zI < zS  zM = 1.
Investors in our model would prefer to enter a market in which non-atomic mar-
ketmakers have some market power, because this gives marketmakers an incentive
to provide intermediation. The efcient level of intermediation is achieved with a
higher market power to marketmakers. Marketmakers themselves prefer to have
full bargaining power.
8 Empirical Implications
This paper lays out a theory of asset pricing and marketmaking based on search
and bargaining. We show how search-based inefciencies affect prices through
equilibrium allocations and through the effect of search on agents' bargaining
position, that is, their outside options based on their ability to trade with other
investors or marketmakers.
Consider, for example, the OTC market for interest-rate swaps, which, accord-
ing to the British Bankers Association has open positions totally roughly $100 tril-
lion dollars. Customers rarely have material private information about the current
level of the underlying interest rates, so standard information-based explanations
of bid-ask spreads are not compelling in this market. Instead, a sales trader
sets spreads based on a customer's (perceived) outside option, and would rarely
fear that the customer has superior information about the underlying interest rates.
The customer's outside option depends on how easily he can nd a counterparty
27himself (proxied by  in our model), and how easily he can access other banks
(proxied by  in our model). To trade OTC derivatives with a bank one needs,
among other things, an account and a credit clearing. Small investors often only
have an account with one or few banks, implying that such investors have lower
search options. Hence, a testable implication of our search framework is that
(small) investors with lower search options receive less competitive prices. We
note that these investors are less likely to be informed, so traditional information-
based models of spreads (for example, Glosten and Milgrom (1985)), applied to
this market, would have the opposite prediction.
The model that we present here can also be viewed as one of imperfect com-
petition, for example in a specialist-based equity markets. In particular, the model
shows that even a monopolistic marketmaker may have a tight bid-ask spread if
investors can easily trade directly with each other (that is, have a high ). This
resembles situations at the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in which there is
a single specialist for each stock, but with oor brokers who can nd each other
relatively easily and trade directly, and with outside brokers who can nd each
other and trade around the specialist by submitting limit orders. On Nasdaq,
however, a phone market with several dealers for each stock, it can be dif-
cult for investors to nd each other directly. Before the reforms in 1994, 1995,
and 1997, it was difcult for investors to compete with the Nasdaq marketmak-
ers through limit orders.21 This may help explain why spreads were higher on
Nasdaq than on NYSE (Huang and Stoll (1996)). Consistent with this view, Bar-
clay, Christie, Harris, Kandel, and Schultz (1999) nd that the Securities and
Exchange Commission began implementing reforms that would permit the public
to compete directly with Nasdaq dealers by submitting binding limit orders ... Our
21See Barclay, Christie, Harris, Kandel, and Schultz (1999) and references therein.
28results indicate that quoted and effective spreads fell dramatically.
The competition faced by marketmakers from direct trade between investors
can perhaps be gauged by the participation rate of marketmakers, that is, the frac-
tion of trades that are intermediated by a marketmaker. Our model suggest that,
with equal marketmaker availability and stock characteristics, stocks with higher
participation rates are characterized by lower search intensity () and, hence,
higher bid-ask spreads. On Nasdaq, the participation rate was once large rela-
tive to the NYSE, which had a participation rate of between 18.8% and 24.2% in
the 1990s (New York Stock Exchange (2001)). At that time, the NYSE may well
have covered stocks whose investors had higher direct contact rates () than those
covered, on average, by Nasdaq.
A Appendix: Proofs




and assume that y > s. The case y  s can be treated analogously. Setting
the right-hand side of Equation (3) to zero and substituting all components of 
other than lo in terms of lo from Equations (1) and (2) and from lo + ln =
d(d + u) 1 = 1   y, we obtain the quadratic equation
Q(lo) = 0; (A.1)
29where
Q(x) = 2x
2 + (2(y   s) +  + u + d)x   ds: (A.2)
It is immediate that Q has a negative root (since Q(0) < 0) and has a root in the
interval (0;1) (since Q(1) > 0).
Since lo is the largest and positive root of a quadratic with positive leading
coefcient andwith anegative root, in order to show that lo <  for some  > 0 it
sufces to show that Q() > 0. Thus, in order that ho > 0 (for, clearly, ho < 1),
it is sufcient that Q(s) > 0, which is true, since
Q(s) = 2s
2 + (u + 2(y   s) + )s:
Similarly, ln > 0 if Q(1   y) > 0, which holds because
Q(1   y) = 2(1   y)
2 + (2(y   s) + )(1   y) + d(1   s):
Finally, since hn = y   s + lo, it is immediate that hn > 0.
We present a sketch of a proof of the claim that, from any admissible initial
condition (0) the system converges to the steady-state .
Because of the two restrictions (1) and (2), the system is reduced to two equa-
tions, which can be thought of as equations in the unknowns lo(t) and l(t),
where l(t) = lo(t) + ln(t). The equation for l(t) does not depend on lo(t),










and note that lo satises
_ lo(t) = G(l(t);lo(t)):
The claim is proved by the steps:
1. Choose t1 high enough that s + l(t)   1 does not change sign for t > t1.
2. Show that lo(t) stays in (0;1) for all t, by verifying that G(w;0) > 0 and
G(w;1) < 0.
3. Choose t2 ( t1) high enough that l(t) changes by at most an arbitrarily
chosen  > 0 for t > t2.
4. Note that, for any value lo(t2) 2 (0;1), the equation
_ x(t) = G(w;x(t)) (A.3)
with boundary condition x(t2) = lo(t2) admits a solution that converges expo-
nentially, as t ! 1, to a positive quantity that can be written as ( b +
p
b2 + c),
where b and c are afne functions of w. The convergence is uniform in lo(t2).
5. Finally, using a comparison theorem (for instance, see Birkhoff and Rota
(1969), page 25), lo(t) is bounded by the solutions to (A.3) corresponding to
w taking the highest and lowest values of l(t) for t > t2 (these are, of course,
l(t2) and limt!1 h(t)). By virtue of the previous step, for high enough t, these
solutions are within O() of the steady-state solution lo.

31Proof of Theorem 2: In order to calculate V and P, we consider a particular
agent and a particular time t, let l denote the next (stopping) time at which that
agent's intrinsic type changes, let i denote the next (stopping) time at another
investor with gain from trade is met, m the next time a marketmaker is met, and





 r(u t)(1   )du + e
 r(l t)Vho1fl=g
+ e
 r(i t) (Vln + P)1fi=g
+ e



















 r(i t) (Vho   P)1fi=g
+e
 r(m t) (Vho   A)1fm=g

;
where Et denotes expectation conditional on the information available at time t.
Differentiating both sides of Equation (A.4) with respect to t, we get (7).
In steady-state, _ V = 0 and hence (7) implies the following equations for the
value functions and prices:
Vlo =
(uVho + 2hnP + B + (2hn + )Vln + 1   )









(dVln + (2lo + )Vho   2loP   A)
r + d + 2lo + 
32(We note that agents on the long side of market are rationed when they interact
with the marketmaker, and, therefore, their trading intensity with the marketmaker
is less than . This does not affect (A.5), however, because the price is the reser-
vation value.) Dene Vl = Vlo  Vln and Vh = Vho  Vhn to be the reservation
values. With this notation, the prices are determined by
P = Vl(1   q) + Vhq
A = Vhz + M(1   z) (A.6)





Vh if s < u
u+d
Vl if s > u
u+d
and M 2 [Vl;Vh] if s = u
u+d. Let
 d = d + 2lo(1   q) + (1   ~ q)(1   z)




> > > <
> > > :
= 1 if s < u
u+d
= 0 if s > u
u+d
2 [0;1] if s = u
u+d:
With this notation, we see that appropriate linear combinations of (A.5)(A.6)
yield
2
4r +  u   u





























r +  u +  d
2




which leads to the price formula stated by the theorem.
Finally, weneedto verify that anyagent prefers, atany time, given all informa-
tion, to play the proposed equilibrium trading strategy, assuming that other agents
do. It is enough to show that an agent agrees to trade at the candidate equilibrium
prices when contacted by an investor with whom there are potential gains from
trade.
The Bellman principle for an agent of type lo in contact with an agent of type
hn, is




 r(u t)(1   )du + e
 r(l t)Vho1fl=g
+ e
 r(i t) (Vln + P)1fi=g
+ e
 r(m t) (Vln + B)1fm=g

;
where  = minfl;i;mg. This inequality follows from that fact that Vh 
P  Vl. It says that selling the asset, consuming the price, and attaining the
candidatevalueofanon-ownerwithlowvaluation, dominates(atleastweakly)the
value of keeping the asset, consuming its dividends and collecting the discounted
expected candidate value achieved at the next time m of a trading opportunity or
at the next time r of a change to a low discount rate, whichever comes rst. There
is a like Bellman inequality for an agent of type hn.
Now, to verify the sufciency of the Bellman equations for individual opti-
mality, consider any initial agent type (0), any feasible trading strategy, , an
34adapted process whose value is 1 whenever the agent owns the asset and 0 when-
ever the agent does not own the asset. The type process associated with trading
strategy  is denoted . The cumulative consumption process C associated with







dt   P dt: (A.8)
Following the usual verication argument for stochastic-control, for any future
















(This assumes without loss of generality that a potential trading contact does
not occur at time 0.) Letting m go to 1, we have V(0)  U(C). Because
V(0) = U(C), where C is the consumption process associated with the candi-
date equilibrium strategy, we have shown optimality.

Proof of Theorem 3: The convergence of the masses  to  is easily seen using
(A.1), whether  or  tends to innity. Let us concentrate on the prices.
1. If s < u=(u+d), then we see using (A.1) that hn tends to innity with
, while lo is bounded. Hence, Equation (A.7) shows that both Vl and Vh
tend to r 1, provided that q > 0. If s > u=(u + d), lo tends to innity with
, while hn is bounded. Hence, Vl and Vh tend to r 1(1 ), provided that
q < 1. If s = u=(u + d), then hn = lo tends to innity with , and Vl
and Vh tend to r 1(1   (1   q)). In each case, the reservation values converge
to the same value, which is a Walrasian price.
352. Equation (A.7) shows that both Vl and Vh tend to the Walrasian price
r 1(1   (1   ~ q)) as  approaches innity.
3. When z = 1, Ak  Bk increases with  because A B = (r+ u+ d) 1
and both  u and  d decrease, since lo and hn do.

Proof of Theorem 4: Let the value function of a sophisticated type- investor be
V s
, and the value function of an unsophisticated type- investor be V u
 . These
value functions and the prices (As, Bs, Au, Bu) are computed as in (A.5)(A.6),
with the modication that the inter-dealer price M is different. For any xed inter-
dealer price M, an agent who meets the marketmaker with intensity , and who
sells as a lo type and buys as a hn type (i.e. with Vl  M  Vh) has value
functions determined by
Vho(r + d) = 1 + dVlo
Vhn(r + d + ) = dVln + (Vho   [zVh + (1   z)M])
Vln(r + u) = uVhn
Vlo(r + u + ) = 1    + uVho + (Vln + [zVl + (1   z)M]):
The system reduces to
Vh(r + d + (1   z)) = 1 + dVl + (1   z)M







1 + (1   z)M








r + (1   z)
1
r + u + d + (1   z)
2




Hence, this agent faces a bid-ask spread of
z(Vh   Vl) =
z
r + u + d + (1   z)
:
We show below, for each case, that M is given by
M =
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
V s
h if s < s u
u+d
V u
h if s u




u+d < s < 1   s d
u+d
V s
l if 1   s d
u+d < s:
(A.10)
Case (a). Consider rst the case s < su=(u + d). The claim is that it is an
equilibrium that the unsophisticated investors do not own any shares and do not
trade. Assuming this to be true, the market has only sophisticated investors, the
interdealer price is M = V s
h, and the buyers are rationed.
It remains to be shown that, with this interdealer price, there is no price at
which marketmakers will sell and unsophisticated investors will buy. First of all,
we note that the optimal response of an investor to the Markov (time-independent)
investment problem can be chosen to be Markov, which means that one only needs
to check the payoffs from Markov strategies that stipulate the same probability of
trade for a give type at any time. The linearity of the problem further allows one
37to assume that the trading probability is 1 or zero. (When indifferent, the choice
does not matter, so we may assume a corner solution.)
There are three possible Markov strategies for the unsophisticated investor that
involve buying: buying as type h and selling as type l, buying as type l and selling
as type h, and buying and holding (never selling).
If the unsophisticated investor buys as an h type and sells as an l type, then
her value function satises (A.9), implying that V u
h < V s
h = M since u <
s. The reservation values are even lower if she buys as an l and sells as an
h type. Finally, if the unsophisticated investor buys and never sells, then her
value function is also smaller than M. This is inconsistent with trading with the
marketmaker, meaning that she never buys.
Case (b). For the case s
h < s < h, the equilibrium is given by an inter-dealer
price of Au = M = V u
h = A(u). This is also the price at which unsophis-
ticated hn-agents buy from the marketmaker, and these agents are rationed. The
sophisticated types hold a total s
h = su=(u + d) of the supply, while the un-
sophisticated types hold the rest. This is clearly an equilibrium for the unsophisti-
cated types. We have to ensure that sophisticated t ypes also behave optimally. In
particular, we have to check that V s
l  M  V s




l  M ,
1 + s(1   z)M
r + s(1   z)
 
(r + d + s(1   z))
r + s(1   z)
1
r + u + d + s(1   z)
 M ,
r + d + s(1   z)
r + u + d + s(1   z)

d
r + u + d + u(1   z)
where the last inequality is satised because s  u. Similarly, it can be veried
that M  V s
h using the same formulae.
38Case (c). The remaining two cases are dual to the ones that we just proved.
To see this, take the following new perspective of an agent's problem: An agent
considers acquiring non-ownership (that is, selling). The number of shares
of non-ownership is 1   s. If an l-type acquires non-ownership then he gets a
dividend of  (1   ) (that is, he gives up a dividend of 1   ). If a h-type
acquires non-ownership then he gets a dividend of  1. Said differently, he gets
a dividend of  (1 ) like the l-type, and, additionally, he has a cost of . Hence,
from this perspective h and l types are reversed, and the supply of shares is
1   s.
This explains why the equilibria in the latter two cases are the mirror images of
the equilibria in the former two cases. In particular, if u
u+d < s < 1   s d
u+d,
then both sophisticated and unsophisticated investors trade, and the unsophisti-
cated l type is rationed.
If 1   s d
u+d < s, each unsophisticated investor owns a share and does
not trade. (Using the alternative perspective, they are out of the market for non-
ownership). The sophisticated investors hold the remaining (1   s) shares, they
trade, and the selling sophisticated investors are rationed.

Proof of Theorem 5:
There exists a number M that maximizes (16) since M is continuous and
M() !  1 as  ! 1.











Consider how both the left and right-hand sides depend on . The left-hand side
39is 0 for  = 0, increasing, and tends to innity as  tends to innity. For z = 0,
A(t;)   B(t;) = 0 everywhere, so the the right-hand side (RHS) is zero, and,
therefore, the unique solution to (A.11) is clearly C = 0. For z > 1, the RHS is
strictly positive for  = 0. Further, the steady-state value of the RHS can be seen
to be decreasing, using the fact that m is decreasing in , and using the explicit
expression for the spread provided by (A.7). Further, by continuity and still using
(A.7), there is " > 0 and T such that @
@m(A   B) <  " for all t > T and all r.
Further, note that rexp( rt) is a density function for all r, and that the closer r
is to zero, the more weight is given to high values of t (that is, the more important
is the steady-state value for the integral). Therefore, the RHS is also decreasing
in  for any initial condition on  if r is small enough. These results yield the
existence of a unique solution.























The integral of the rst integrand term on the right-hand side of (A.12) is the
same as that of (A.11), and that of the second is negative for small r. Hence, the
right-hand side of (A.12) is smaller than the right-hand side of (A.11), implying
that C(1) > M.
To see that C(z) is increasing in z, we use the Implicit Function Theorem
and the dominated convergence theorem to compute the derivative of C(z) with
40respect to z, as
rE
R 1





dm(C)(A(C;z)   B(C;z))e rt dt
: (A.13)
If we use the steady-state expressions for , A, and B, this expression is seen to
be positive because both the denominator and the numerator are positive. Hence,
it is also positive with any initial masses if we choose r small enough.

Proof of Theorem 6: (i) The rst part of the theorem, that the monopolistic mar-
ketmaker's search intensity does not affect investors when they can't search for
each other, follows from (A.5), which shows that investor's utility is independent
of .
(ii)Wewanttoprovethattheinvestorwelfareisdecreasingin, whichdirectly
implies that the marketmaker over-invests in intermediation services.
We introduce the notation Vo = Vho   Vlo, Vn = Vhn   Vln, and  =
Vh   Vl = Vo   Vn, and start by proving a few general facts about the
marketmaker spread, .
The dynamics of  are given by the ordinary differential equation (ODE)
_ t = (r + d + u + 2(1   q)lo + 2qhn)t   ;

















This can be viewed an ODE in the function
@
@ by treating t is a xed function.
41It can be veried that 0 <
@
@ < 1 in the limit as t ! 1, that is, in steady state.




@ < 0. Hence,
















u du > 0:
Consider now the case q = 1, for which, since Vhn = Vln = 0,
_ Vho(t) = rVho(t) + dt   1:
Differentiating both sides with respect to  and using arguments as above, we see
that
@Vho(t)
@ < 0 since
@t
@ > 0. Consequently, Vlo(t) = Vho(t)   t also decreases
in .
If q = 0, then (A.5) shows that Vlo and Vho are independent of . Further,
_ Vln(t) = rVln(t) + u(t   Vo(t)):
As above, we differentiate with respect to  and conclude that Vln(t) decreases
in  since
@t
@ > 0 and Vo(t) is independent of . Consequently, Vhn(t) =
Vln(t)   t + Vo(t) also decreases in .

Proof of Theorem 7:














where we have used that C(0) = 0, that
dC
dz > 0 at z = 0 (see (A.13)), that
42A   B = 0 if z = 0, and that for all t, d
dlo(t;) < 0.
To prove that zI < zS  zM = 1, it sufces to show that the marketmaker































suppressing the arguments t and  from the notation, where we have used twice
the fact that  0() = rE
R 1
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